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There is general agreement that institutional shareholders have been the major force
driving the movement for better standards of governance and accountability in corporate
business worldwide. How does this work in an 'emerging' market where foreign
institutional investors can establish a dominant market position but need to interact with
business cultures run by local promoters and low in corporate transparency? This paper
argues that while the foreign institutional investors (FIIs) have established considerable
leverage over Indian companies, and mounted successful pressure for modernisation of
the stock market, their role in corporate governance is unlikely to be as significant as
that of the domestic institutions which own substantial chunks of equity in Indian
industry.  The paper looks at the controversy surrounding the Securities and exchange
Board of India’s, ( SEBI)’s,  draft code of corporate governance and suggests that
regulators seeking to enforce higher standards of governance in globally integrating
markets should reinforce the position of institutional shareholders rather than
undermining it. 
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Introduction
The last decade of the 20
th century produced a landslide in the corporate hierarchies of
Indian business. The opening of the economy in the 90s has meant that global investment
banks, management consultancies, and fund managers are active in the market today, and
the evolution of business can no longer be isolated from their influence. The private
business sector in particular has had to adjust both to increased levels of competition,
following the delicensing of industry and dismantling of tariffs, and to the changing nature
of the capital market, which has seen a revolution in terms of infrastructure and
considerable re-regulation to improve disclosure and transparency. The net result of these
changes has been that by the end of the decade it was clearly felt that in the family-
controlled business sector, which is the backbone of private business in India, ‘Only big
family-run businesses with global operations and professional management will survive’.
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In other words, liberalisation and the renewed integration of the domestic economy with
the world economy have undermined the political defences of Indian capital, even though
these survive on a large scale in the form of a durable nexus between businessmen and
politicians. More interestingly, however, firms that benchmark themselves internationally
have opted into disclosure standards that are more rigorous than those required in India
itself, reversing the logic of regulatory arbitrage. They have done this in the recent past by
seeking listings on the NYSE or NASDAQ, thus exemplifying a model of ‘functional
convergence’ in corporate governance standards which seems to be a rapidly expanding
alternative to the kind of reform perspectives represented by local self-regulation or
mandatory corporate law reform.
2  Under ‘functional convergence’ the crucial advances
are made at the level of securities market regulation and the mechanism that allows for
convergence itself is the migration of firms to better regulated jurisdictions with substantial
pools of capital, and of course the influence this exerts on the domestic market.  But
transparency has a complex architecture and the case of at least one of these foreign
issuers (Reliance) will show us why functional convergence may work within rather
narrow institutional limits. 
Before coming to the Indian case, it may be helpful to outline at least four interesting
perspectives on the study of governance, which I shall call ‘regulatory’, ‘financial’,
‘institutional’, and ‘corporate law’ respectively. Corporate governance may be seen as part
of a world-wide countertrend to deregulation which seeks to ‘maintain the confidence of
the investing public in the financial markets’. Here the assumption is that deregulation and
re-regulation are not two opposing forces but ‘processes that run hand in hand’.
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Secondly, the pressure for ‘better corporate governance’ can also be seen as a function of
the fierce competition within the Anglo-American fund management industry, and, more
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new financial capitalism of the 80s and 90s.
4 The competition in question is a competition
for institutional clients or, more precisely, for the savings that they embody, between the
large fund-management groups. Thirdly, corporate governance may be seen as in some
sense an inevitable expression of the ‘socialisation’ of capital and the tensions this
generates between financial and managerial capitalism. This is a perspective in perfect
harmony with Marx’s views about the ‘abolition of capital as private property within the
framework of capitalist production itself’ in the famous chapter on the credit system in
vol.3 of Capital, but its fullest statement is the classic study by Berle and Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, which has exerted an enormous influence on
subsequent literature. In the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s, ‘managerialism’ became a
battering ram in the hands of academics who set out to reassert the claims of ownership
against effete corporate managers whose self-seeking had ostensibly ruined American
industry.
5 But the universality of this vision is doubtful: concentrated ownership survives in
many business regimes throughout the world and assumes a variety of forms.  Finally,
much of the academic interest in corporate governance can also be seen as in some sense
an acknowledgement of the failure of company law to legitimate corporate managerial
power and the problems this raises for a future reconstruction of the legal architecture of
the joint-stock company.
6 Needless to say, each of these perspectives is valid, and they are
all essential to a more complete formulation of the issues. These are issues which are
largely implicit in the paragraphs which follow, which start by looking at the kind of
business transformation that is occurring in India.
Reform of the capital market is certainly the most tangible achievement of the Indian
liberalisation.
7 Reforms here have ‘far outstripped the process of liberalisation in every
other sector of the Indian economy’, it has been said.
8 The automation of the stock
exchanges took roughly three years, and by 1998 all 23 exchanges in the country had 100
per cent automated screen-based trading, vastly improving market transparency, reducing
bid-offer spreads, and effecting a reduction in transaction costs. Automation also facilitates
order trading by allowing for tighter surveillance and monitoring of the market.
Dematerialisation of shares has eliminated the risks associated with paper-based securities
in terms of bad delivery, fake or forged certificates, etc., again reducing transaction costs.
85 to 90% of the actively traded securities are now traded in dematerialised form. For
institutional investors the number of scrips on the compulsory demat list has been aroundQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 4
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500 since January this year. Virtually all institutional trades have been subsumed by demat
within just two years. Thirdly, in 1998 SEBI began to shift the market from the accounting
period (or account dealing) system to a five day rolling settlement, barely three years after
the London Stock Exchange made a similar move. Shorter settlement cycles mean better
liquidity and larger trading volumes. Finally, in terms of regulation, cash flow statements
and quarterly reporting of results are now mandatory for listed companies, and the
committee on disclosure standards set up by SEBI has recommended consolidation of
accounts and segmental reporting. There has also been a plethora of new regulations
involving all the main market intermediaries from brokers and merchant banks to credit
rating agencies, mutual funds, and financial analysts. In short, between SEBI and the
National Stock Exchange the financial landscape is being significantly reworked to bring
India into line with international best practice. However, when one looks at the domestic
business system, these transformations appear close to inexplicable, if not anomalous. The
reference here is not to the kind of resistance that the evolution of the NSE encountered,
as a nation-wide, professional exchange not run by brokers, among the coteries controlling
the Bombay Stock Exchange,
9 but the wider business system that saw itself being
outflanked by the transition in the market. Interviews suggest that the committee on
disclosure standards encountered a fair degree of resistance, precisely from the ‘industrial
houses and big industrialists’, as one respondent stated. What, one might ask, in that case,
is driving the transformation of the Indian capital market?
Investor capitalism: the FIIs
Much of the change in the capital market has been driven by the presence and activity of
the so-called foreign institutional investors. Their demands were of prime importance in
the rapid modernisation of the market which occurred between 1996 and 1999. As of
January 2000, the net cumulative investment by FIIs stood at $10.22 billion, up from less
than a billion in 1993 when they first entered the market. The obvious question is – how
significant is this figure? In late January 2000 the market capitalisation of the Bombay
Stock Exchange was roughly $239 billion, which would mean that FII investment was
barely 5% of market capitalisation. However, the denominator that matters is not total
market capitalisation but the level of the free float, that is, the shares that are actually
publicly available for trading. In interviews it was established that the floating stock in the
Indian market is probably less than 25 to 30 per cent on the aggregate, and that the FIIs
probably own 50% of the free float in most of the big stocks. (Much of the retail segment
does not form part of the free float, since small investors have often never traded in their
shares since the date of the original allotment.) Interviews with fund managers conducted
mostly in 1998 confirm this impression. The investment universe of the leading fund
managers is structured around a core portfolio of the top 50 companies, even if most fund
management firms might track up to 300 companies very closely. Concentration on the big
stocks means a higher average size of holding in those companies, and it seems likely thatQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 5
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collectively this is generally anywhere between 15 and 30% in most large companies.
10
(Till the most recent budget, the aggregate cap on all FII subaccounts was 24% of the
total paid-up capital of a company, with a restriction of 10% on each individual fund, and
companies allowed to raise the ceiling to 30% by a special resolution. It follows that FIIs
were fully invested in a large range of companies.) The general conclusion reached by
Barth and Zhang in their study of the East Asian markets is thus certainly true of India,
namely, that ‘in the context of limited free float, foreign investors are a major presence’.
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(The reference here, of course, is to portfolio investors.) 
By “investor capitalism” I mean a system of capitalism where financial institutional
investors control a significant and increasing chunk of the world’s stock markets and the
accumulation of capital, that is, corporate management and production are largely driven
by the returns to financial capital. In the rapid changes which the Indian business sector
has seen since the early 90s, the FIIs are the obvious expressions and exemplars of this
system, and it is worth looking more closely at the nature of their impact on the private
sector. As of March 1999 there were 450 FIIs registered with SEBI but interviews suggest
that only between 50 and 100 of them are actually active at the moment. The foreign
brokerages who form part of the same investment banking groups also control the bulk of
the foreign institutional business. (Indian brokers, by contrast, dominate the speculative
trades which account for the bulk of the turnover on the exchanges.) With investment
time-frames of 6 months to 2 years,
12 active management of portfolios, and fierce
competition in the asset management business world-wide, the ability and credibility of
managements become of paramount importance to the fund managers, and the discourses
of “shareholder value” spread through the market as a benchmark language in which these
messages are conveyed and valuations established. Fund managers rate quality of
management as their most important investment factor. Unlike growth prospects, quality
of earnings, or the strength of the balance sheet,
13 factors like execution of corporate
strategy or management credibility are not quantifiable and not even financial data in the
conventional sense.
14 They are in fact shorthand expressions for rather complex business
cultures and structures which are never apparent on the surface. At any rate, fund
managers have to make assessments of the general quality of a business depending on their
view of the integrity of management. Management integrity was especially important
because when they first entered India in the early 90s institutional investors poured money
into a market they barely understood. At that stage the market had been massively
manipulated and was much higher than it should have been. ‘GDRs suddenly became a
possibility…but Indian managements saw it as an opportunity to get some cash…QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 6
cheaply… on the back of these completely ramped share prices and domestic valuations…
went out into the market, raised 50 million dollars or a 100 million dollars or whatever it
was, they worked up huge amounts of money, came back, and did absolutely nothing with
it!  And the rumour was that there were fund managers around the world who didn’t even
know the name of the company to pay for those records…They believed in the companies,
though the domestic valuations were completely rigged anyway, and they’ve all lost an
enormous amount of money’.
The late 1990s were thus marked by a prolonged slump in the equity market, a flight to
quality, and a severe erosion of the market capitalisation of whole swathes of Indian
industry. This, and the general recession in industry, was the background against which
Indian businessmen began to mouth platitudes about ‘Corporate Governance’. What also
happened in this period is that the fund managers rapidly created a position of leverage
over companies, and by the late 90s the more forward-looking family businesses
reciprocated by scrapping proposals investors disapproved of (mergers, investment
projects, diversification, etc.), claiming to professionalise boards, and setting up regular
channels of communication with analysts and fund managers. In private corporate
managers would complain that the FIIs were ‘driving their investment decisions’, and
senior executives referred repeatedly, in interviews, to the considerable amounts of time
they spent in meetings and presentations with research analysts and chief investment
officers. For their part, the fund managers are naturally conscious of their position of
strength. As one of them explained, ‘FII investments are spread over no more than 300 to
400 companies. Clearly for these companies it makes a big difference what foreign
investors think about your management practices’. That was in the asset management arm
of one of the big US investment banks. Another respondent said, ‘We have large funds.
We have to take reasonable stakes in a company, so we do some serious work, try to find
out whether these are the companies which can give us value over the medium term. And
if we think so, then  we take a very good stake in a company, (so much so) that that the
promoter cannot ignore us…I think we are in a position of strength most of the time. If
we call, he’d better return the call if he’s not there’. In the financial markets in India there
is a widespread view that the governance culture of Indian business is being revamped by
the market, and this model of ‘accountability to the market’ is something I wish to come
back to later. 
Transparency and the issue of control in the family business sector
Against this background let me turn, briefly, to the subject of these seeming
metamorphoses, namely, the Indian business houses. The ‘reshaping’ of business is largely
a story about transparency, but a brief background would be useful. With a few striking
exceptions, the vast majority of Indian companies are family-controlled and a significant
proportion of them among the larger listed concerns belong to business houses which have
traditionally formed the mainstay of the Indian private sector. The other important type of
enterprise is the foreign-controlled company, usually a subsidiary. In one survey of the top
150 companies (by market cap) in 1999, MNCs accounted for 26% of the total, which isQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 7
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substantial.
15 Of course, both sets of companies raise Cadbury-style issues of corporate
governance, but at this stage, certainly to some degree in rather different senses. Leaving
the MNCs aside for the moment, it is interesting to note that the 90s produced a strong
differentiation within the family business sector, undermining any common front of family
capital. Among the older family conglomerates, the majority were plagued by fragmented
businesses and problems of succession. Families which retained a labyrinth of cross-
holdings but accommodated the pressures of succession by dividing the companies in
terms of management control, would face considerable dissension in the 90s, and the
public financial institutions did little to stop the fragmentation of these groups as if they
were estates run by a family of landlords. These businesses have simply sunk quietly into
oblivion, ruined by family feuds, lack of professionalism, and the plunder of company
resources. Secondly, there were promoter groups of more recent origin and unbridled
ambition. The majority of these groups took liberalisation to mean a licence to expand
recklessly into the high prestige deregulated infrastructure sectors which had formerly
been reserved for the PSUs – oil & gas, power, telecoms, etc. These were unrelated
diversifications, funded by the term-lending institutions with astonishing standards of
project appraisal (or so it appears), and the downturn of the middle 90s left almost all of
them stranded with huge liabilities, over-stretched resources, and unfinished projects. It
may be worth remarking that these two categories of promoter businesses account for the
largest share of the non-performing assets (NPAs) of the financial institutions.
16 They are
mostly substantial defaulters, and became notorious for siphoning funds from their listed
companies. A third type of family conglomerate, more successful than any of the others, is
chiefly represented by the Tatas and the Aditya Birla group which is now run by his son
Kumar Mangalam Birla following his untimely death in 1995. These are the old venerable
businesses of India, and their problem is one of survival through restructuring, of retaining
control over a diversified set of businesses which remain competitive and injecting a much
deeper sense of cohesion into the group. This streamlining of the conglomerate business
structure coupled with corporate branding is best exemplified by the Tata group, where
Ratan Tata’s emphases have been very much on welding a core set of businesses (ten to
twelve) into a tightly-knit group with a strong sense of its own corporate values.
Individual boards are now subject to the supervision of a Business Review Council which
will represent the group. The Tata companies have always had professional managers,
even if the Tatas themselves have insisted on having a large number of their own nominees
on the boards. Control has been a major preoccupation of this strategy, both in the
functional sense of removing the dead wood from the dispersed oligarchies of the earlier
period, and in the financial sense of increasing the holding companies’ stakes in key
operating companies of the group. Whether this strategy succeeds is anybody’s guess.
Ratan Tata himself is now a few years from his own much-publicised retirement age of 65,
and it is far from obvious how the succession will be structured. At any rate, groups in this
category have been consolidating furiously and struggling to retain a sense of leadership in
a world turned upside down by ‘globalisation’. Finally, a fourth category, the stars of the
fin-de-siècle family business galaxy, highly focused single-company businesses driven byQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 8
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first-generation entrepreneurs or software engineers who have built world-class enterprises
which have been handsomely rewarded by the stock markets. Again, these companies are
in various stages of evolution, with Reliance on its way to becoming an integrated
conglomerate giant exploiting global economies of scale in petrochemicals and oil,
Ranbaxy professionalising its management and expanding in the global pharmaceutical
industry, Infosys listing on NASDAQ as the fifteenth largest IT scrip, and so on. Taken
with the best-run and fastest-expanding multinational subsidiaries such as Hindustan
Lever, with the best of the PSUs, and the more successful companies in the third category,
they form the dynamic core of Indian business in the era of global economic integration. In
short, taking the four categories together, the landscape of family business is a highly
differentiated one, with distinct models, overlapping characteristics, and intersecting cycles
of growth and decline. The least likely to survive are the third- or fourth-generation
inheritor businesses, the most likely are the aggressive, fast-expanding, focused companies.
Having said this, however, and drawn these contrasts, it is particularly important to note
that with a very few notable exceptions, the business culture that has sustained growth
through the complex and changing regulatory environment of India is one common to
most of these companies. In other words, governance is much less differentiated than
strategy or performance. Indian promoters have traditionally retained control through
inter-corporate investments and holding companies. This is not a recent feature of the
business houses, it was apparent to R. K. Hazari when he studied business groups in the
early sixties, using data from 1951 and 1958, and explained the evolution of these
structures in terms of the steep tax rates on incomes and heavy estate duties after death,
which, as he said, ‘induced the rich to impersonalise their shareholdings’. Indeed, one of
the chief recommendations of his study was the regulation of the investment companies.
‘Inter-corporate investment is the main instrument, and an increasingly important one, for
the control of companies’, Hazari wrote.
17 For example, the Birla controlling blocks in the
1950s were based on ‘substantial holdings by investment companies supplemented by
circular chains of investments which return to their starting points, and investments by
industrial companies in other companies the business of which is altogether different’.
18 In
most cases, he observed, ‘the chains of inter-corporate investment can be traced back to
large investment companies registered mostly in the forties in the former princely states of
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan…[T]hese companies have played a crucial role in the
holding of Birla controlling blocks, besides trading in shares and commodities, sometimes
among themselves at arbitrary prices…’.
19 Hazari calculated that the Birlas had 151
investment and trading companies in 1958. The decades that followed do not appear to
have made a dent in this picture. Investment companies are legion within the hidden
recesses of corporate groups. Interviews conducted jointly with colleagues reveal that the
Sarabhais, for example, are said to have ‘more than 200 [investment] companies, and all
the companies were named after rivers, they ran out of names!’. Reliance, I was told by
the legal director of a foreign company, has 400 investment companies operating from one
common premise. This was stated ‘on the authority of the Secretary, Company Affairs’.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 9
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The R.P. Goenka group is reported to control its stakes in the operating companies
through at least 59 investment companies.
20 And the papers report that it took the
government arbitrator eight years to unravel the cross-holdings of the Modi group before
he could award a settlement in an acrimonious dispute between the brothers.
21 Cross-
holdings and investment companies are thus the mainstay of promoter control, and their
immediate implication is that a very large number of operating companies are publicly
listed but woven into dense networks of control through the holdings of group investment
companies and cross-holdings of other group operating companies. This situation is
fraught with conflict of interest, as in many other family-dominated business regimes such
as France, Italy or South Korea, and for institutional investors transparency is thus all-
important as a tool of control over corporate managements. Consolidation of accounts, the
international reporting standard on related party transactions, the institution of Audit
Committees, the strengthening of boards, and the independence of Auditors are thus all
perfectly logical and consistent demands, and give the international drive for ‘corporate
governance’ an obviously progressive aspect. But regulation doesn’t function in a vacuum,
and the working group set up to draft amendments to the Companies Act 1956 ruled out
mandatory consolidation of accounts, for example, because it would expose those patterns
of control, as one was reliably told. ‘The reason why consolidation was opposed was
precisely this reason. And it was opposed by people who were, let’s say, closest to the
Indian business houses’. Not only had the mainstream of domestic business ensured that
the redrafting of the Companies Act would largely reflect their own perspectives, but 1997
saw a significant move by companies and businesses to engage in and publicise corporate
governance initiatives. Since then these initiatives have taken various forms such as the
induction of professionals on the board, the setting up of Audit Committees, the drafting
of formal succession plans, a growing move to adopt US GAAP or start the preparatory
work for a listing on the New York Stock Exchange, and, finally, the revamping of Annual
Reports to convey substantially better information or include a formal section on
Corporate Governance. Significantly absent in this welter of self-improving initiatives has
been any widespread move to set up nomination committees composed exclusively of
independent directors. Without independent directors (and not just “grey area” non-
executives) Audit Committees are largely meaningless, boards remain cosmetic and subject
to control, and there is still no clear mechanism of accountability. There is, in other words,
a subtle interplay of form and substance at work, acceptance of form, rejection of
substance. In saying this, it is not my intention to deny that there is a fluid core of well-run,
professionally-managed companies which are keen to prove their credentials by public
statements of governance structure or reform and support for better standards of
disclosure. Indeed, it would be foolish to downplay the value of this vanguard. The point is
one about realism. Indian business has in the past demonstrated a superlative capacity to
subvert or escape regulation by ‘incorporation’ or creative compliance, and in the growing
genuflection before corporate governance both anti-regulatory strategies may well be at
work. The recent SEBI Code of Corporate Governance requires all listed companies to
have at least a one-third proportion of independent directors on the board, and even offers
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transactions with the company, its promoters, its management or its subsidiaries, etc.’ But
nomination committees are a telling omission in the Code and the selection of these so-
called independent directors is thus left to the existing promoter-dominated boards.
22 How
does SEBI propose to ensure that boards will really contain the requisite core of
independent directors? And why, if independent directors are so crucial anyway, does it
further undermine the accountability of boards by being so deeply ambivalent about the
role of institutional nominees? Again, the point is not that the Code is not a step forward
by the standards of Indian business but that regulation is shaped by both regulatees and
regulators. The danger of having a code of best practice mandating a series of committees
without any substantial change in the integrity of business or the dominant corporate
culture is fairly obvious. As one respondent company argued, ‘All the Indian promoters
will be absolutely delighted!…The fact is that you will continue to do what you do but you
will have the complete shelter and umbrella of protection from these committees, and the
committees will be staffed by a whole series of people who are, in quotes, as I said,
“independent”…(It boils down to not having genuinely independent directors, is that what
you’re saying?) Well, at the end of the day who will appoint them? Is the Central
Government going to sit and appoint the independent directors? And what can an
independent director do? He would comment on what is brought to him, and that is where,
at the heart of the issue, is the ethics and integrity inherent within a corporation...’.
The domestic financial institutions: towards institutional activism?
Let me turn, finally, to the most interesting issue of all, namely, the role of the institutional
shareholders in the general revamping of corporate governance and accountability. The
domestic financial institutions have substantial stakes in a very wide range of companies,
because the expansion of domestic capital was for decades funded by the so-called
development banks with the ultimate widespread conversion of their loans into equity, and
because of the substantial investments of the UTI and LIC, one a unit trust, the other an
insurance company. The widespread failure of boards in India is largely a failure of the
public financial institutions to enforce the requisite supervision over companies which
promoters ran with unilateral authority and minimum interference, even when their own
stakes in the companies in question were minimal. But the public financial institutions are,
or have been till very recently, government-controlled, and it was their unstated or
understood function to bolster incumbent managements against possible hostile bids, in
other words, stabilise control by existing promoters. Given the political constraint on their
role as potential institutional monitors, it seems pointless to make too much of the fact that
in relying on internal resources in the appointment of nominees to boards, the institutions
failed to provide quality monitors with the characteristics required of so-called
independent directors, namely, the ability to question and challenge management (rather
than provide them with comfort) and of course a good understanding of the business itself.
However, today the situation is different and changing fast, because liberalisation has putQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 11
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an end to the era of development banking, the term-lending institutions have been
redefining themselves as universal banks operating to commercial imperatives in a highly
competitive industry, and they themselves are under pressure to perform from their own
expanding base of shareholders. The chief legacy of the earlier epoch of directed lending
with poor standards of appraisal or, as some allege, outright corruption, is of course a
huge backlog of non-performing assets which most experts agree are substantially
understated and which is certainly the most worrying feature of the Indian financial system
today. (A banking analyst at one of the FIIs has estimated that the government will have to
pump in $6½ to 14 billion to recapitalise the banks.) The second interesting aspect of the
changing circumstances is that the investment institutions have begun to change their own
trading strategies, under the demonstration effect of the FIIs, and given the massive
erosion in the net asset values of the UTI’s holdings in the market, which recently
triggered both public outcry and a blueprint for reform. In short, if previously the
institutions enjoyed neither liquidity nor control due to political restrictions, today there is
a distinct if tentative and cautious move towards both liquidity and control, and the general
thinking seems to be that it would make sense for the institutions to concentrate their
monitoring skills rather than disperse them widely, and liquidate stakes where
managements have consistently under-performed, by selling to strategic investors (i.e.
competitors). The sense of this almost seismic shift in institutional psychology has in turn
spread panic among promoters, and led to orchestrated campaigns to remove their
nominees from boards, pre-empt stake sells by the right of first refusal, and so on. The
most telling vertical split in the ranks of Indian business today relates precisely to this issue
of whether domestic institutional shareholders should increase or decrease their monitoring
role, with all the apex chambers and particularly the CII pressing for a dramatically
reduced role, and the institutions themselves seeking stronger standards of governance.
There is, thankfully, a sector of the Indian corporate class, especially professional
managers in both Indian and foreign businesses, which supports the idea that institutional
activism will be the saving grace of the future.
Before I say more about this, however, let me return to the foreign institutional investors
who have in some sense been the prime movers in this whole transformation. It seems
overwhelmingly obvious to me that unlike the role they play in their own domestic
markets, particularly the UK, their role in emerging markets like India will continue to be
largely one of seeking accountability through the market, that is, exiting companies rather
than using voice. As the head of one of the largest US funds stated, ‘We are not long-term
strategic investors…By and large you vote with your feet, you exit, dump the stock if
you’re unhappy with the management…By and large we vote with our feet’. There are a
few exceptional fund managers who believe that the mutual funds should intervene actively
in the AGMs, but so far there is a clear consensus that the FIIs have not been vocal
enough. Thus it seems to me that even with the US pension funds entering the Indian
market,
23 one is not likely to see any significant change in the kind of governance impact
the FIIs have had so far, certainly not their active involvement on boards, unlike the
private equity funds who mainly finance smaller unlisted ventures and supervise businesses
rather closely. The model of ‘accountability to the market’ is an acceptable but imperfectQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 12
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form of regulation, and this, it seems to me, bounces the ball back into the domestic
institutional court. SEBI’s ambivalence about the role of institutional shareholders is
contrary to the trend in other markets, but stems, ostensibly, from the argument that
nominees are privy to price-sensitive information which renders the institutions vulnerable
as insiders. One should note, however, that studies in the UK show that the flow of price-
sensitive information is a regular feature of company/institutional interaction and not
peculiar to a situation such as that in India, where, uniquely, the institutions have their
nominees on the board. Therefore, unless the proposal is to restrict all interaction between
FIs and investee companies – something manifestly absurd and contrary to the Code’s own
recommendation for more activism from these shareholders – the question of removing
nominees from the board is beside the point. What is required is a thorough review of the
Chinese Wall in both domestic and foreign institutions, in view of the widespread
perception that frontrunning is rampant among institutional investors. Secondly, and more
fundamentally, institutional participation in the market is still not sufficiently broad based,
despite the rapid institutionalisation of the market in the 90s. That is to say, even if the
level of institutional holdings is high, somewhere between 30 and 40% in the aggregate,
the holdings are also highly concentrated rather than dispersed more widely over a
multiplicity of institutional investors. This coupled with government control of the
domestic institutions opens the way to political influence and corruption. As the head of
one of the larger business houses stated candidly, when asked whether he was worried by
the prospect of hostile bids, ‘It will largely happen that way, but right now, of course, to
put it politely or impolitely, you use your contacts, political and otherwise, etc., to see
that takeover bids…hostile takeover bids don’t succeed, so you go along to the financial
institutions, etc., whatnot, put pressure on government, it’s happened in the past, it’s likely
to happen’. In other words, government control of the FIs has been crucial to the control
promoters have exercised over their companies. On the other hand, ‘the day the
government lets loose these institutions, in terms of their control over them, you will
certainly see a lot more aggressive activism from them’.
24 Here, then, is a further paradox
- reduction of government control over the public financial institutions should mean
greater activism and more professionalisation. Coupled with the willingness to vote out
promoter directors, this should be a boost to the market for corporate control and
accelerate the rationalisation of business structure through Mergers & Acquisitions,
speeding up consolidation in fragmented industries and adding scale to individual
businesses. Mergers & Acquisitions are currently the cream of the investment banking
business in India and expected to grow in a substantial way once the takeover code
becomes sufficiently aggressive. Overriding all of these is the desperate need for the
growth of a properly developed institutionalised savings sector, in pension funds and life
insurance, in other words, a domestic fund management industry with a much wider
coverage of the PF beyond the meagre ten percent of the labour force which it currently
provides for. As the investment guidelines regulating the Provident Fund corpus are
liberalised and the provident funds managed competitively, with more than a single fund
manager and some portion of the funds flowing into investment-grade securities in the
private sector (to boost real rates of return), the share of institutional shareholdings would
expand significantly and promoter control will increasingly be a thing of the past.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS54 Page 13
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Certainly, these are the international trends and the issue is not whether they will happen in
India, but how long it will take.
Summary
To sum up: Since 1993 foreign institutional investors have driven change in the Indian
market. This has produced a crisis in the traditional hierarchies of Indian business as asset
size and political influence matter much less now than business factors and the valuation of
companies in the market. Standards of research have improved dramatically in the last five
years and the top 200 companies are heavily researched today. There is a close and regular
interaction between management, research analysts and fund managers. One implication of
all this is a huge premium on transparency. On the other hand, few corporates want
transparency, because, as one industrialist said, ‘One of the banes of Indian family-owned
business is keeping their holding close to their chest’. Corporate governance has been put
on the agenda of Indian business because of all these changes, and one has seen a clear
differentiation between companies with reputational capital and the larger swathes of
industry who are sinking rapidly into oblivion. In this context, a major issue concerns the
role that the domestic institutions will play in shaping new standards of accountability and
governance. Those who wish to see more sweeping changes in Indian society have an ideal
opportunity to debate a vital set of issues about the role the financial institutions should
play and the inevitable underlying question of ‘who should be regarded as having a valid
interest in the company’.
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